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Artificial intelligence (AI) was initially developed as an implicit moral agent to solve simple              
and clearly defined tasks where all options are predictable. However, it is now part of our                
daily life powering cell phones, cameras, watches, thermostats, vacuums, cars, and much            
more. This has raised numerous concerns and some scholars and practitioners stress the             
dangers of AI and argue against its development as moral agents that can reason about ethics                
(e.g., Bryson 2008; Johnson and Miller 2008; Sharkey 2017; Tonkens 2009; van Wynsberghe             
and Robbins 2019). Even though we acknowledge the potential threat, in line with most other               
scholars (e.g., Anderson and Anderson 2010; Moor 2006; Scheutz 2016; Wallach 2010), we             
argue that AI advancements cannot be stopped and developers need to prepare AI to sustain               
explicit moral agents and face ethical dilemmas in complex and morally salient environments. 
Explicit moral agents need to independently engage in moral reasoning to find solutions in              
situations where two or more ethical imperatives collide. Ethical theories build the foundation             
for such moral reasoning and have been used in the past to support AI decision making.                
Anderson and Anderson (2007) for example applied a Utilitarian perspective and discussed            
how AI can be used to calculate the total net pleasure of an act. However, Utilitarianism is                 
only beneficial when all options are identifiable and the outcomes can be assessed in terms of                
pleasure and displeasure. Consequently, AI scholars now seem to favour a deontological            
approach to machine ethics that stresses the importance of justice and principles (Kant 2013).              
However, current deontological approaches (e.g., Anderson, Anderson, and Berenz’s (2018)          
eldercare robot) require that all ethical principles are predefined and applied using static             
rule-based filtering. The exhaustive search of ethical principles becomes intractable in           
complex cases such as self-driving cars and AI-based diagnosis systems. Even if the ethical              
principles that should be applied have been hard coded by AI engineers, the balance between               
these principles remains an open question. 
Despite the limitations discussed, AI Ethics scholars still heavily focus on outcome and             
action-focused approaches and dismiss Virtue Ethics since it is agent-based (Anderson and            
Anderson 2007) (for an exception see Govindarajulu et al. 2019). This is unfortunate as              
ignoring knowledge from the domain of Virtue Ethics will potentially result in flawed explicit              
moral agents who narrowly focus on outcomes and actions and neglect to include ethical              
metrics into the recursive policy learning process that shapes future AI decisions. Hence, the              
purpose of this research is to review the virtue ethics literature, identify important             
characteristics, and apply them to the AI context. 
Virtue Ethics focuses on the virtues a decision maker should possess. Confucius, Plato,             
Aristotle, Hume, and Nietzsche have developed slightly different forms of virtue ethics            
(Swanton 2003). However, at the core of each approach are virtues that represent deeply              
integrated character traits. One should not single out a specific virtue, but strive for the golden                
mean, a state where virtues are balanced. For example, Aristotle focused on justice, charity,              
courage, truthfulness, modesty, and friendliness while Confucius stressed patience,         
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knowledge, sincerity, and obedience. To be virtuous means that one tells the truth not because               
of the consequences of lying or because lying is bad, but because of his or her views about                  
honesty and deception. Virtue Ethics is agent based and focuses on the person by raising               
questions such as: What kind of person should I be? To be a virtuous person, an individual                 
has to have the right intentions. While some (e.g., Slote, 2001) argue that an act is good as                  
long as the decision maker has good intentions, most scholars agree that the goodness of an                
act cannot solely be defined by the decision maker’s motives. Good intentions need to be               
paired with good acts (Zagzebski 2004). This approach is more objective and acknowledges             
that biases may distort a decision maker's motivations and motives. While the goodness of an               
act can potentially be assessed post hoc, individuals’ intentions are impossible to observe.             
Moreover, individuals are often unable to explain their intentions, making them difficult to             
measure. 
Explainability has been the focus of much AI research and scholars have developed several              
algorithmic tools to improve the transparency of AI decisions (e.g., Doran et al. 2017;              
Lundberg and Su-In 2017; Ribeiro, Singh, and Guestrin, 2016; Shrikumar, Greenside, and            
Kundaje 2017). Our review indicated that Doran’s framework has the most potential to serve              
as the foundation to create a virtue ethics based explicit moral agent since the authors argue                
that AI systems should be augmented by a reasoning engine that uses one of the previous                
explainability methods to abstractly mimic how humans extract the critical features for            
decision making. However, a common property between all current AI methods is that they              
only consider the explanatory variables during inference. In other words, the explainable            
deduction are artefacts rather than a core component shaping the way the machine makes              
decisions. We claim that to successfully create a virtue ethics based explicit moral agent              
requires that the explainable policies are trained with explainable deductions identified by a             
previous inference step. Only then can the source of unethical conduct be identified,             
understood, and corrected. This process is similar to a parent telling a child: “don’t do that                
because you may hurt someone” and not simply “don’t do that”. This is important since it will                 
allow AI to communicate its intentions. More importantly, when unethical conduct is            
detected, developers can analyze and correct the source of the conduct, thereby teaching AI to               
engage in acts a virtues person would engage in. Hence, we extend the framework of Doran et                 
al. (2017) by adding an additional training step after the generation of the explainable              
deductions. By ensuring that the machine includes the explanatory variables to learn the             
critical features to make decisions, one can verify whether the learned features are similar to               
those of a virtuous person, at least from an interpretability perspective. 
As described in Figure 1, our modified framework relies on two sequential steps: 
1. a regular AI inference phase to generate explainable deductions corresponding to the             
explainable framework introduced by Doran et al. 
2. a contextual AI training phrase that includes the generated explainable deductions as             
part of the dataset. 
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Figure 1:​ Our training framework extending the work of Doran et al. (2017) 
 
While training explainable policies using this framework will take longer, we suggest that             
such a computational cost is needed not only to make the policy dependent on the explainable                
variables, but also to have stronger metrics to assess the quality of the learned policy. In fact,                 
the second step introduced in this framework not only contextualizes the output of the policy               
but also provides a new paradigm for evaluating the AI models. During the testing phase of                
self-driving cars for example, license providers can fix the input of the model (e.g. image) and                
only vary its context. This methodology extends the performance assessment biased toward            
the system’s accuracy by evaluating the impact of the explainable variables on the choice of               
the policy. Furthermore, the explainable deductions can be used as a proof by systems’              
designers to explain wrong policy decisions of AI systems. Self-driving cars would be able to               
present the explainable deduction to the police or insurance company to assess the car’s              
reasoning and appropriateness of the policy outcome. If the action taken by the car was in fact                 
inappropriate based on the assessment of the explainable deduction, changes to the domain             
knowledge base can be made to ensure proper future conduct. Additionally, one can control              
the values of the explainable variables toward some target values for specific applications to              
guarantee a desired behavior. In this way, regulators can drive the way the domain knowledge               
base is shaped by providing specific explainable variables that AI models are expected to use               
during their training. The explanatory variables can thus bridge the gap between engineering             
teams and regulatory agencies. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
In line with Anderson and Anderson (2007), most AI scholars follow an outcome or              
action-driven approach and focus on principles that need to be followed to ensure ethical              
conduct. However, as discussed, this approach has numerous shortcomings. While some           
actions may be universally right or wrong, others depend on the context. The Heinz dilemma               
(Colby et al. 1987) portraits a classic example: Should a husband steal a life saving drug for                 
his dying wife? What if the pharmacist declined a payment plan and reasonable non-monetary              
compensation? Stealing is wrong but considering the context and the intention, one might             
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reason that it is ok for Heinz to steal the medicine and save his wife’s life. Our framework                  
takes contextual information that contains the critical granular features that shape the best             
action to take into account. Moreover, this information is readily available for audits and can               
be used to improve future reasoning. Hence, we believe that our framework better represents              
how individuals make decisions and can be used to develop virtuous machines. 
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